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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Following the decision in In re C.R., it became far too easy for the 
state of Ohio to take people’s children away from them.  Gone are the 
days when only bad parents lose custody of their children.  This is 
because the courts in Ohio no longer have to make sure that a parent is 
bad before it orders that legal custody be severed.1  Stated differently:  
“when a juvenile court adjudicates a child to be abused, neglected, or 
dependent, it has no duty to make a separate finding at the dispositional 
hearing that a noncustodial parent is unsuitable before awarding custody 
to a nonparent.”2 
This is the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in In re C.R.  If this rule 
seems unsettling, there are several explanations.  One is that it is 
unconstitutional, as it falls short of the requirements for procedural due 
process.  In many ways it is also unwise.  Ohio juvenile courts are 
charged with considering the best interests of children above anything 
else.3  Though the In re C.R. ruling may seem to adhere to this admirable 
ideal, a closer look shows that it has the capability of harming children 
by forever separating them from their fit, biological parents. 
The justices of the United States and Ohio Supreme Courts have 
examined how best to ensure the best interests of children on numerous 
occasions.4  They have generally decided that if a court is going to award 
legal custody of a child to a nonparent, that court must first make two 
separate findings: 1) that it is in the best interests of the child, and 2) that 
the child’s parent is an unfit parent.5 
The two-pronged test for legal custody was used in Ohio for many 
years.  Then, in 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in In re C.R. 
changed the standard to a one prong test (the best interest of the child) in 
cases where the child has first been adjudged abused, dependent, or 
neglected.6 
This article will endeavor to show that the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
ruling in In re C.R. makes it too difficult for parents to retain custody of 
their own children.  By exploring United States Supreme Court 
precedent, it will be shown that the rule emerging from In re C.R. does 
 
 1. See In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 1-24.  
 2. In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 30. 
 3. Id.   
 4. See generally Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., N. C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 
(1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
 5. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977); See generally Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27; 
Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656. 
 6. See In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at ¶ 1-24. 
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not pass procedural due process muster.  It will also be shown that the 
Ohio Supreme Court disregarded its own precedent and in doing so, 
created a rule that undermines the policies of its own juvenile law 
system.  By providing the rudiments of juvenile jurisprudence, the facts 
and decision of In re C.R., and an analysis that shows the Ohio Supreme 
Courts’ oversights and errors in its decision, the author hopes to 
persuade Ohio lawmakers to reevaluate the way that juvenile court 
custody cases should be conducted in the future. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In 1877, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a seminal juvenile law 
decision, Clark v. Bayer, in which it ruled that a parent is generally, but 
not absolutely, entitled to the custody of his or her children.7  The child’s 
welfare is the paramount consideration and the state may separate a child 
from her parents “if necessary to attain that end.”8  Since that time, it has 
been up to the courts and legislators to figure out how those difficult 
decisions should be made.9 
This section will explain some basic principles and rules of juvenile 
law that derive from the United States Constitution and Ohio law.  First, 
the article will explore U.S. Supreme Court rulings on constitutional due 
process and the importance of a parent’s right to have custody of their 
children.  This exploration will show that due process requires that a 
parent be found unfit before a court may sever legal custody of his 
children.  The article will then explain the procedures used in juvenile 
court custody cases in Ohio, the formation of those rules and the way 
that they have changed since being formed.  Through this analysis, the 
author hopes that the reader will begin to see how Ohio law changed 
after In re C.R. in such a way that renders the current procedures 
unconstitutional. 
 
 7. See 32 Ohio St. 299, 306 (Ohio 1877). The Ohio Supreme Court held that when a father 
had given custody of his children to their grandfather, the father was not then allowed to take the 
children back by force without going through the court.  “While the father has prima facie right to 
the custody of his minor children, his right is not an absolute and unqualified right.  He may 
relinquish or forfeit it by contract, by his bad conduct, or by his misfortune in being unable to grant 
proper care and support.” Id. at 307. 
 8. Id. at 305.  After the affections of both child and adopted parent become engaged 
and a state of things has arisen which cannot be altered without risking the happiness of 
the child, and the father wants to reclaim it, the better opinion is that he is not in a 
position to have the interference of a court in his favor. His parental rights must yield to 
the feelings, interests, and rights of other parties acquired with his consent.   
Id. at 306. 
 9. See id. 
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A. Parents have a Fundamental Right to the Care, Custody, and 
Control of their Children 
Juvenile law is a matter of state jurisdiction.10  The Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution requires that certain safeguards 
be provided to those who enter that system.11 
The United States Supreme Court announced in 1923 that the right 
to “establish a home and bring up children” is among the rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.12  The result of that recognition is that a parent's right to 
take care of his own children may not be interfered with by the state 
“without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of 
the state to effect.”13 
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court fortified that right by stating that 
procreation is a basic civil right.14  Further guidance was provided to the 
nation's juvenile courts two years later when the Court came out with 
their decision in Prince v. Massachusetts.15  In Prince, the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized that the care, custody, and control of children reside 
first in their parents.16  The decision goes on to emphasize that states 
 
 10. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151 (West 2006).  The juvenile laws of Ohio can be found in 
the Ohio Revised Code section 2151.   
 11. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 
(1980)). The “minimum requirements [of procedural due process] being a matter of federal law, they 
are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem 
adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.”  Id. 
 12. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“While this Court has not attempted to 
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and 
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely 
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men.”). 
 13. Id. at 400.  The Court held that the Nebraska law that forbade the teaching of foreign 
languages to children was an unconstitutional burden on the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. 
 14. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Court found it unconstitutional to 
punish criminals through sterilization.  Id. 
 15.  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).  The Court ruled that the state had the 
authority to interfere with a mother's ability to allow her child to sell religious magazines on the 
street.  Id. 
 16. Id. at 166 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).  “It is cardinal with us 
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”  Id. 
4
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have an interest in protecting children and may limit parental freedom 
when doing so is necessary for the welfare of a child.17 
After Prince, a precarious balancing theory was established in 
custody cases.18  The goal was to balance a parent's fundamental right to 
rear his own children against the state's interest in ensuring the wellbeing 
of those children.19  Disregarding that necessary balance in favor of the 
state’s interests would result in a violation of a parent’s fundamental 
right to the care, custody and control of his children.  The United States 
Supreme Court would later establish a clearer standard, which would 
specifically include an inquiry into the fitness of the parent.20 
B. Termination of Custody Proceedings Require Procedural Due 
Process Safeguards 
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court considered what 
procedures are constitutionally due to a parent at risk of losing custody 
of his or her children.21  The United States Supreme Court explained that 
both the state and the parents have an interest in the outcome of a 
custody case, but at some point, their interests diverge.22  This 
divergence is the reason parents need the protection of the Due Process 
Clause.23 
One year later, the United States Supreme Court announced that a 
natural parent involved in a state's parental rights termination proceeding 
must be provided with fundamentally fair procedures.24  The Court 
 
 17. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (“It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, 
that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and 
independent well-developed men and citizens.  Between contrary pulls of such weight, the safest 
and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely but for guides, in 
narrowing the no man's land where this battle has gone on.”). 
 18. See infra pp. 901-02. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 21. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).  This case decided that an 
indigent parent who is in danger of losing custody is required to have appointed counsel only on a 
case-by-case basis.  Id. 
 22. Id. at 28. 
 23. Id. (“The State’s interests, however, clearly diverge from the parent’s insofar as the State 
wishes the termination decision to be made as economically as possible and thus wants to avoid 
both the expense of appointed counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings his presence may 
cause.  But though the State’s pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to 
overcome private interests as important as those here….”), 
 24. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
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mentioned specifically that a parent’s liberty interest does not diminish 
because they have failed to be a model parent.25 
The Due Process Clause protects private citizens from the 
government's desire for efficiency and economy.26  If a parent is not 
ensured appropriate due process and he loses custody of his child, other 
remedies, such as attempting to become guardian or adopted parent to 
the child, are not adequate.27 
C. Due Process Requires a Finding of Parental Unfitness in a Custody 
Dispute between a Parent and Nonparent 
Performing a due process analysis in the context of juvenile 
adjudications is fundamentally the same as that which is done in other 
types of cases.  Due process requirements for a particular case depend on 
the facts and the nature of the interests of both the state and the private 
party.28 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge is a 
seminal ruling on what is necessary to ensure due process.29  The Court 
held that “the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity 
 
 25. Id. at 753 (“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or 
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.  Even when blood relationships are strained, 
parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.  If 
anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for 
procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.”). 
 26. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (“Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of 
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the 
fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that 
may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre 
ones.”). 
 27. Id. at 647 (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)) (“[W]e reject any 
suggestion that we need not consider the propriety of the dependency proceeding that separated the 
Stanleys because [Father] might be able to regain custody of his children as a guardian or through 
adoption proceedings . . . . This Court has not, however, embraced the general proposition that a 
wrong may be done if it can be undone.  Surely, in the case before us, if there is delay between the 
doing and the undoing petitioner suffers from the deprivation of his children, and the children suffer 
from uncertainty and dislocation.”). 
 28. See id. at 650-51 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961)).  
That case explained that “the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible 
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation” and firmly established that “what 
procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a 
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private 
interest that has been affected by governmental action.”  Id. 
 29. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  The Court held that a man who was 
denied welfare assistance by an administrative agency decision was not deprived of constitutional 
procedural due process.  Id. 
6
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to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”30  They 
announced three factors that require consideration in order for the 
necessary procedural elements to be decided: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.31 
The Eldridge factors were subsequently used by the United States 
Supreme Court in deciding what procedures were constitutionally due in 
termination of custody cases.32 
The procedural safeguard that needs to be in place between the 
adjudication of abuse, dependency, or neglect and the disposition of 
custody to a nonparent is a finding of parental unfitness.  Thirty years 
after Prince, the United States Supreme Court began in earnest to 
confront some of the ways the states were inadequately achieving the 
balance between a parent's interest in raising his children and the state's 
interest in insuring the welfare of those children.33 
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Stanley v. Illinois.34  That opinion strengthened a parent’s right to 
prevent the state from severing custody of his children and ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment required that a father be allowed a hearing on 
his fitness as a parent before being deprived of the custody of his 
children.35  The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the interest 
of a parent in keeping his family intact is due high deference.36 
Stanley did not disturb the state’s power to separate children from 
their neglectful parents.37  Instead, the United States Supreme Court held 
 
 30. Id. at 333 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 
U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). 
 31. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 32. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). 
 33. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 34. Id.   
 35. See id. The Court held that the Illinois statute that made it a presumption that an unwed 
father is unfit was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. 
 36. Id. at 651. 
 37. See id. at 652. 
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that in order to do so, the state must use the appropriate means.38  The 
means that the state must allow before severing a parent's custody 
include a finding that the parent is unfit.39  The United States Supreme 
Court reasoned that the fitness adjudication would be dispositive in most 
cases because if the parent is found to be fit, then the state's interest in 
caring for the children is de minimis.40 
Later, in Troxel v. Granville, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded its 
discussion of parental fitness, holding that “there is a presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their children.”41  In so holding, Troxel 
stands for the rule that if the parent is fit then there is probably no need 
for the state to interfere.42  Troxel also stated that in custody termination 
cases, the Due Process Clause requires more than a judge deciding what 
is best.43 
E. Juvenile Law in Ohio 
In Ohio, the juvenile courts are required to have bifurcated hearings 
in abuse, neglect and dependency cases.44  The first hearing is an 
adjudication of whether the child is abused, dependent, or neglected and 
the second hearing is a disposition on custody.45  Such bifurcated 
hearings were first statutorily required in 1969.46 
 
 38. Id. at 652 (“But we are here not asked to evaluate the legitimacy of the state ends, rather, 
to determine whether the means used to achieve these ends are constitutionally defensible.”). 
 39. Id. at 658.  The convenience of having a presumption of unfitness is “insufficient to justify 
refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.”  Id. 
 40. Id. at 652-53 (“What is the state interest in separating children from fathers without a 
hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a particular disputed case?  We observe 
that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the 
custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when 
it needlessly separates him from his family.); id. at 657-58. 
 41. See 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000).  The Court held that a Washington statute giving grandparents 
the right to visitation was too broad because it did not give due deference to the wishes of fit 
parents.  Id. 
 42. Id. at 68-69 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)) (“[S]o long as a parent 
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to 
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make 
the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.”). 
 43. Id. at 72-73 (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the 
fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 
"better" decision could be made.”). 
 44. In re Murray, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (Ohio 1990).  See Am. Sub. H.B. No. 320 (133 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 2040, 2061); cf. Juv. R. 29 and 34, respectively, on the treatment of adjudicatory and 
dispositional hearings.  Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. In re Murray, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1172-74 (Ohio 1990). 
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The Ohio Revised Code section 2151.23 gives Ohio juvenile courts 
the authority to make custody decisions in cases in which a child has 
been adjudicated dependent, neglected, or abused.47  The statute does not 
offer criteria upon which the courts should base their decision of 
custody, so the Ohio Supreme Court established a two-prong test to use 
in deciding whether to award the custody of a child to a nonparent.48  
The two-prong test balances the interests of the parent with the welfare 
of the child.49  The first prong asks what would be in the child’s best 
interests.50  The second prong asks whether the parent is unfit.51  
Unfitness is established if a preponderance of the evidence indicates 
“abandonment, contractual relinquishment of custody, total inability to 
provide care or support, or that the parent is otherwise unsuitable—that 
is, that an award of custody would be detrimental to the child.”52 
The foundation of the two-pronged test is found in both Ohio 
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.53   
Many decisions depend on the proposition that parents have a 
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children.54 
In 1926, Ohio's juvenile jurisprudence was expanded by the Ohio 
Supreme Court's decision in Rarey v. Schmidt.55  In that case, the Ohio 
 
 47.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23 (West 2006).  The relevant section states: 
Jurisdiction of juvenile court. (A) The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction 
under the Revised Code as follows: (1) Concerning any child who on or about the date 
specified in the complaint, indictment, or information is alleged to have violated section 
2151.87 of the Revised Code or an order issued under that section or to be a juvenile 
traffic offender or a delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent child and, based 
on and In relation to the allegation pertaining to the child, concerning the parent, 
guardian, or other person having care of a child who is alleged to be an unruly or 
delinquent child for being an habitual or chronic truant; (2) Subject to divisions (G) and 
(V) of section 2301.03 of the Revised Code, to determine the custody of any child not a 
ward of another court of this state. 
Id. 
 48. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977).  That case held that a mother who signed 
a contract purporting to give custody of her child to the babysitter must have an unsuitability hearing 
before the court can sever her custody and award it to a nonparent.  Id.  
 49. Id. at 1052. 
 50. Id. (“The welfare of the child is the interest given priority the ‘first’ interest.”). 
 51. Id.  As opposed to a custody proceeding in a divorce case, which would be under the guise 
of O.R.C. § 3109.04, a decision of custody between a parent and a nonparent requires more than an 
inquiry into the best interest of the child.  Id. 
 52. Id.  The Court states that the parents may be denied custody only if one of the 
circumstances on that list is found to exist.  The Court further explained they did not intend a 
“finding of unsuitability to connote only some moral or character weakness.”  Id. at n.12. 
 53. See generally Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
 54. See generally Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27; Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656. 
 55. See Rarey v. Schmidt, 154 N.E. 914 (Ohio 1926). 
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Supreme Court expounded on the use of dependency, abuse, and neglect 
adjudications in relation to custody issues.56  The Court's jurisdiction to 
find a child to be abused, dependent, or neglected exists for the purpose 
of ensuring the welfare of the child, not for empowering nonparents 
against parents.57 
F. The Rule Begins to Change in Ohio 
The rule that there must be a finding of parental unfitness before 
custody can be awarded to a nonparent began to erode in Ohio with the 
Ohio Supreme Court's 1979 decision of In re Cunningham.58  
Cunningham held that once there has been an adjudication of 
dependency, there is no statutorily mandated requirement for a separate 
finding of parental unfitness before making an award of permanent 
custody to a nonparent.59  The decision emphasizes that the best interest 
of the child are paramount and the parent's interest in custody must be 
subordinate to that.60  Three years after the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision in In re Cunningham, the United States Supreme Court 
reiterated their decisions that a parent has a fundamental right to the 
care, custody, and control of their children.61  Over the next several 
 
 56. See id.  The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to award 
custody of a child to the caregiver through a dependency adjudication when the mother was not 
given notice of the hearing.  Id. 
 57. Id. at 522 (“That section and related sections were enacted to promote the health, morals, 
and well-being of dependent and otherwise unfortunate children, and, as an incident and means of 
accomplishing such purpose, the power was conferred upon certain courts to confide the custody 
elsewhere than with the parents.  The legislation was intended as a shield for the infant, but not as a 
sword to be wielded by a stranger to deprive the parent of his day in court upon an issue of the 
custody of his minor child, and was not designed for the purpose of judicially creating a nominal 
custodian and empowering such custodian to surrender custody of the child to another without the 
knowledge or consent of the parent.”). 
 58. 391 N.E.2d 1034 (Ohio 1979).  The Court purported not to have overruled In re Perales 
and cited that decision in explaining how the concepts of best interest and unfitness overlap.  See id. 
at 1034 n.7 (quoting In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-52 (Ohio 1977)).   
 59. See id. at 102.  The Court looked to O.R.C. 2151.353(D) and found no explicit 
requirement “that a finding of parental unfitness is a prerequisite to its implementation.”  Id. at 103. 
 60. Id. at 106.  The court quoted an Alabama ruling in stating that “the mere fact that a natural 
parent is fit, though it is certainly one factor that may enter into judicial consideration, does not 
automatically entitle the natural parent to custody of his child since the best interests and welfare of 
that child are of paramount importance.”  Id. (citing Willette v. Bannister, 351 So. 2d 605, 607 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1977)). 
61. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).   
It is plain that a natural parent’s “desire for and right to” the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children' is an interest far more precious than any 
property right.  When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks 
10
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years, the Ohio Supreme Court bolstered this rule with several opinions 
in which it states that a parents holds this fundamental and paramount 
right.62 
In 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court again examined the necessity of a 
finding of parental unfitness before legal custody may be awarded to a 
nonparent in In re Hockstok.63  It was decided that the dictates of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and precedent 
from both the United States and Ohio Supreme Courts require that "in 
custody cases between a natural parent and a nonparent, a parental 
unsuitability determination must be made and appear in the record before 
custody can be awarded to a nonparent."64  The Ohio Supreme Court 
went on to state that a parent must be given only one unsuitability 
determination, and then the focus shifts to the best interests of the 
child.65  As will be discussed in the next section, In re C.R changed that 
rule completely.66  The father in that case and parents in many cases to 
follow received no such determination.67 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This section will present the facts of the case of In re C.R., the issue 
presented in that case, the parties’ arguments, and the courts’ decisions 
and dissents.  The author hopes that by learning the facts of this 
particular case, which acutely altered juvenile law in Ohio, the reader 
may be better able to contextualize the issues of child custody, neglect, 
and parental unfitness.  Learning the facts will also help the reader 
appreciate the complexities that often accompany these types of cases 
and realize the unfairness of Ohio’s new rule, especially as applied to the 
case from which it originated. 
                                                                                                                                 
not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.   
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59. 
 62. In re Murray, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171-72 (Ohio 1990), In re Shaeffer Children, 621 
N.E.2d 426, 429-30 (Ohio Ct. App., Van Wert County 1993), In re Adoption of Mays, 507 N.E.2d 
453, 455-56 (Ohio Ct. App., Hamilton County 1986), Masitto v. Masitto, 488 N.E.2d 857, 859-60 
(Ohio 1986) 
 63. 781 N.E.2d 971 (Ohio 2002).  In that case, the Court decided that the lower court erred in 
awarding legal custody of a child to her grandparents because there was no finding that the mother 
was unfit.  Id. 
 64. Id. at 246. 
 65. Id. at 247.  Such a determination establishes or takes away “a parent’s fundamental 
custodial rights.”  Id.   
 66. See In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 1-24.  
 67. Id. 
11
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The child C.R. was born in 2000.68  She was a drug dependent 
infant.69  On July 20, 2001, Cuyahoga County Department of Children 
and Family Services (CFS) removed C.R. from her mother’s home.70  
Emergency custody was awarded to CFS and C.R. was placed in the care 
of her maternal uncle and his wife, Clifford and Stephanie Reust (Aunt 
and Uncle).71  When this occurred, CFS did not know the identity of 
C.R.’s father.72 
The child’s father, Jesse Crowler (Father), was also unaware of his 
paternity at that time.73  When Susan Reust (Mother) was pregnant with 
C.R., she lied to Father and told him that she was not pregnant.74  
Statements made by representatives of CFS also led Father to believe 
that he was not the father.75   
Patricia Brennan (Paternal Grandmother) was in contact with baby 
C.R. because she was caring for Mother and Father’s two older children 
and the siblings were able to visit with each other.76  At some point 
before Aunt and Uncle motioned for custody of C.R., they told Paternal 
Grandmother that they believed Father was C.R.’s biological father.77 
 
 68. Brief of Appellants Clifford and Stephanie Reust at 4, In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 
2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188 (No. 2004-2031). 
 69. In re C.R., No. 82891, slip op. ¶ 2 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Aug 26, 2004), rev’d, In re C.R., 
108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188.  The removal occurred when C.R.’s 
mother was arrested on drug charges.  Brief of Appellants Clifford and Stephanie Reust, supra note 
68, at 4.  Shortly after birth, C.R. also contracted hepatitis and had to be hospitalized.  Id. at n.1. 
 70. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder at 1, In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-
1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188 (No. 2004-2031).  C.R.’s mother had custody until this date.  Id. 
 71. Brief of Appellants Clifford and Stephanie Reust, supra note 68, at 4.  Pursuant to a 
probable cause hearing, C.R. was placed with her aunt and uncle immediately after being taken out 
of the custody of her mother.  In re C.R. at ¶ 4.  Emergency custody was not awarded to CSF until 
July 24, 2001.  Id.   
 72. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 1.  The father was listed as “John 
Doe, address unknown” on CFS’s complaint.  Id.  
 73. Id. at 8.  Mother and Father had a long-standing inconstant relationship and had two older 
children together who were in the custody of their maternal grandmother.  In re C.R., No. 82891, 
slip op. ¶¶ 1-2 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Aug 26, 2004), rev’d In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-
1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188. 
 74. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 8.  Father heard through a 
separate court proceeding that Mother might be pregnant.  He called her and asked her if it were true 
and she said that it was ridiculous.  “Mother testified that she lied to Father about being pregnant.”  
Id. 
 75. Id.  Paternal Grandmother told Father that a social worker from CFS informed her that the 
father of C.R. was “a man that Susan lived with or lived by, and was dead or no longer around.”  Id. 
 76. In re C.R., No. 82891, slip op. ¶ 2. 
 77. Id.  Aunt and Uncle testified to this in the trial.  Id.  Father’s two older children also told 
him that he might be the father. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 8. 
12
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After hearing these rumors, Father decided to initiate genetic 
testing.78  As a result of the genetic tests, paternity was established in 
November 2001.79  Father hired a lawyer and filed a motion for 
temporary placement/custody and temporary orders and a motion for 
legal custody.80  CFS filed a case plan that included requirements for 
Father, which he completed.81  Aunt and Uncle also filed a motion for 
legal custody.82 
An adjudicatory hearing on CFS’s complaint for neglect was held 
on July 8, 2002.83  Pursuant to that hearing, C.R. was adjudicated to be a 
neglected child.84  Father was not referenced in CFS’s complaint,85 but 
appeared at the hearing with his attorney.86 
A. The Trial Court Awards Legal Custody to Aunt and Uncle 
A dispositional hearing was held over three days on October 15, 
2002, November 21, 2002, and December 10, 2002.87  The issue before 
the trial court was whether Aunt and Uncle, Paternal Grandmother, or 
 
 78. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 8.  Establishment of paternity 
was delayed because of two failed attempts by Father to have CFS, Aunt, and Uncle appear for 
genetic testing.  Id. 
 79. Brief of Appellants Clifford and Stephanie Reust, supra note 68, at 4.  The genetic testing 
results showed a 99.8% possibility that Father was the biological father.  Merit Brief of Appellee 
Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 8. 
 80. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 8. 
 81. Id. at 2.  The case plan requirements for Father were to establish paternity and to attend 
parenting classes.  Id.  In addition to satisfying the requirements of the case plan, Father “visited the 
child regularly, bonded with the child, had a stable and appropriate home, an appropriate job and 
income, did everything [CFS] asked him to do, took parenting classes successfully, did a drug and 
alcohol evaluation, took random urine screens and attended domestic violence classes.”  Id.  
 82. Id. at 1. 
 83. Id. at 2.  The adjudicatory hearing had been continued several times.  Id. 
 84. Id.  Mother consented to an amended complaint admitting neglect.  Brief of Appellants 
Clifford and Stephanie Reust, supra note 68, at 10. 
 85. Id.  Father’s brief states that he did not admit to neglecting his minor child.  Merit Brief of 
Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 2.  In their brief, Aunt and Uncle argue that by failing to 
object to the finding of neglect at the trial, Father lost his right to require the court to make a finding 
that “the neglect was the result of action on behalf of both parents.”  Brief of Appellants Clifford 
and Stephanie Reust, supra note 68, at 13. 
 86. Brief of Appellants Clifford and Stephanie Reust, supra note 68, at 12. 
 87. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 8.  In the Ohio Supreme Court 
decision, the judge chastises the trial court for taking two months to complete a three-day 
disposition, stating that “[i]t is a disservice to litigants and lawyers when judges or magistrates do 
not conduct hearings on consecutive days.”  In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 
N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 19. 
13
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Father should be granted legal custody of C.R.88  After the trial, the court 
awarded legal custody to Aunt and Uncle.89 
The trial court explained that it would be detrimental to remove the 
child from Aunt and Uncle’s home where she had lived almost all of her 
life.90  The Court also expressed doubt about whether Father was really 
committed to raising C.R.91  The court found that any of the three 
moving parties could provide a good home for the child.92  Ultimately, 
the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the 
best interests of C.R. to remain with her Aunt and Uncle, and so legal 
custody was awarded to them.93  The trial court did not make a 
determination as to whether Father was an unsuitable or unfit parent.94 
B. The Court of Appeals Reverses the Trial Court’s Ruling  
Father appealed the trial court’s disposition.95  On appeal, the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether “the trial 
court committed an error when it applied the ‘best interest of the child’ 
standard in making its decision to award custody to the aunt and uncle” 
rather than “finding that he was unsuitable as a parent before depriving 
him of custody.”96 
 
 88. In re C.R. at ¶ 6.  Paternal Grandmother moved for custody of C.R. six months after 
Father filed his motion for custody.  In re C.R., No. 82891, slip op. ¶ 3 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Aug 26, 
2004), rev’d In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188. 
 89. In re C.R., No. 82891, slip op. ¶ 5.  The disposition was originally heard before a 
magistrate in the juvenile court.   
 90. Id.  The Magistrate’s report stated that “[i]f the child was moved from the [Aunt and 
Uncle] she could face confusion and/or loss of security and stability.  This risk is not justified when 
the child is presently placed in a loving home which meets all the child’s needs.”  Id.  
 91. Id.  The decision stated that “Father’s demeanor during trial indicated that he has not been 
committed to [the older two children] in the past and his present demeanor shows less than vigorous 
desire to take legal custody of [C.R.].  If the child was granted into the legal custody of dad it is 
questionable if father or [paternal grandmother] would raise the child.”  Id.  
 92. Id ¶ 4.  The Eighth District Court of Appeals decision expresses that Court’s belief that the 
two days’ worth of testimony showed that Father, Paternal Grandmother, or Aunt and Uncle could 
provide a good home for C.R.  Id. 
 93. Id. ¶ 6. 
 94. Id. ¶ 20.  “In fact, it expressly found that he could provide an adequate home for her.”  
 95. Id ¶ 7. 
 96. Id. ¶ 11.  Specifically, the Appeals Court addressed three of Father’s alleged grounds for 
reversal:  
1) The juvenile court erred and abused its discretion by denying appellant-father his 
federal constitutional rights and fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and 
management of his child as protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution; 2) The juvenile court erred and abused its discretion by denying appellant-
father custody of his minor child because the juvenile court failed to make a 
14
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The appeals court reversed the trial court’s decision.97  The appeals 
court found that the lower court had misinterpreted the case law and 
misapplied it to this case.98  Specifically, the appeals court found that the 
applicable statute “does not provide a test or standard for the juvenile 
court to use to determine child custody cases,” but that the case law 
offers an overriding principal.99  That overriding principal, the appeals 
court said, is where there is a custody dispute between a parent and 
nonparent, the lower court must recognize the natural parent’s 
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child.100 
The appeals court cited the 2002 Ohio Supreme Court decision, In 
re Hockstok, as the applicable precedent.101  In quoting Hockstok, the 
appeals court stated that “[t]o protect [the natural parent’s] fundamental 
interest, ‘a finding of parental unsuitability has been recognized by this 
court as a necessary first step in child custody proceedings between a 
natural parent and nonparent.’”102 
The appeals court pointed out that CFS’s argument relied on a prior 
decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, In re C.F., which held 
that “when a child has been adjudicated neglected, a suitability finding is 
not required.”103  The appeals court rejected that reasoning, viewed 
CFS’s reliance as misplaced, and found that “the C.F. court 
misinterpreted the case law and its applicability to the situation at 
hand.”104  They held instead that Hockstok was controlling.105 
                                                                                                                                 
determination that appellant-father was unsuitable prior to awarding custody to a 
nonparent as recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in In re Hockstok.…; and 3) The 
juvenile court erred and abused its discretion in using the ‘best interest’ standard in 
making its custody determination in this matter and denying appellant-father custody 
based on this standard, and erred and abused its discretion in determining that the best 
interest of the minor child would be served by awarding legal custody to the maternal 
aunt and uncle.   
Id. ¶¶ 7-11. 
 97. Id. ¶ 27. 
 98. Id. ¶ 19.  The Court sustained all three of Father’s assignments of error that they 
addressed.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.  The statute that the Court said was applicable in this case is OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2) (West 2006). 
 100. In re C.R., No. 82891, slip op. ¶ 18 (quoting In re Hockstok, 98 Ohio St. 3d 238, 2002-
Ohio-7208, 781 N.E.2d 971, at ¶ 15). 
 101. Id ¶ 18 (quoting In re Hockstok). 
 102. Id. (quoting In re Hockstok at ¶ 18). 
 103. Id. ¶ 19 (citing In re C.F., 8th Dist. No. 82107, 2003-Ohio-3260). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. ¶ 19. 
15
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One judge concurred in the court of appeal’s majority decision and 
one judge dissented with a separate dissenting opinion.106  In the 
dissenting opinion, the judge expressed the opinion that “there is no 
requirement that the trial court make an explicit finding of parental 
unsuitability before awarding custody to a nonparent in such a 
situation.”107  In addition, the dissenting judge stated that if a finding of 
unsuitability were necessary, there was sufficient evidence presented at 
trial to show that Father was an unsuitable parent.108 
C. The Ohio Supreme Court Certifies the Issue and Reverses the 
Appeals Court 
After the Eighth District Court of Appeals decided in Father’s 
favor, the Ohio Supreme Court certified the case in order to answer a 
question upon which the appellate courts had disagreed.109  The Ohio 
Supreme Court examined whether:  “In a case in which a juvenile court 
has adjudicated a child to be abused, neglected, or dependent, is the 
court also required to make a separate determination of parental 
unsuitability as to each parent at the dispositional hearing before 
awarding legal custody to a nonparent?”110 
CFS, Aunt and Uncle, and Father all submitted briefs to the Court 
on this question.  CFS took the position that because the best interests of 
the child are paramount, this is the only inquiry that needs to be made at 
disposition.111  CFS relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in In re 
Cunningham for the proposition that the parent’s right to care, custody, 
and control must be subordinate to the child’s best interests.112  CFS 
 
 106. See id. ¶ 27.  The Honorable Diane Karpinski, P.J. concurred and the Honorable Anthony 
O. Calabrese, Jr., J. dissented. 
 107. Id. ¶ 30 (citing In re C.F., 8th Dist. No. 82107, 2003-Ohio-3260). 
 108. Id. ¶ 33 (“The evidence presented casts doubt on appellant’s ability to provide for the best 
interests of C.R.  Appellant has two other children that he was under order to visit while supervised.  
In addition, appellant was in arrears with child support regarding those children.  Appellant did not 
keep in regular contact with C.R., did not offer financial support, and failed to visit her in the 
hospital.  Appellant never sought custody of his two other children.  The fact that appellant never 
sought custody of his two other children demonstrates to me his propensity to leave his children’s 
upbringing to his mother, P.B.”). 
 109. In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 1. 
 110. Id at ¶ 8.  Stated another way, the Court was answering the question “whether, before 
awarding legal custody to a nonparent, a trial court must first find the noncustodial parent unsuitable 
when a child has been determined to be abused, neglected or dependent.”  Id. at ¶ 1. 
 111. Merit Brief of Appellant Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services 
at 3-4, In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188 (No. 2004-2031). 
 112. Id. at 3 (quoting In re Cunningham, 391 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ohio 1979)).  The brief 
quotes Cunningham, stating that “the fundamental or primary inquiry at the dispositional phase of 
16
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asserted that the Appellate Court misapplied Hockstok.113  CFS asked 
that the Ohio Supreme Court decide that C.R. remain in the custody of 
Aunt and Uncle.114 
Aunt and Uncle, through their brief, advocated for the same result 
as CFS, but their arguments were different.115  First, Aunt and Uncle 
asserted that Father acquiesced to the finding that C.R. was neglected by 
both parents when he failed to object to the holding of neglect.116  Next, 
they argued that a finding of neglect is equivalent to a finding that Father 
is an unsuitable parent and the purpose at the disposition is solely to 
decide the best interests of the child.117  Lastly, Aunt and Uncle asserted 
that, based on the facts, Father is an unsuitable parent.118 
Father argued in his brief that “a trial court must make an explicit 
finding that a parent is unsuitable before awarding legal custody to a 
nonparent.”119  Father supported this contention by asserting that 
according to United States Supreme Court precedent, a natural parent 
has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his child 
which is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.120  Father asserted that the 
evidence does not support a finding that he was an unfit parent.121 
                                                                                                                                 
these juvenile proceedings is not whether the parents of a previously adjudicated ‘dependent’ child 
are either fit or unfit.”  Id. 
 113. See id. at 4-5.  CSF asserts that Hockstok is limited to custody proceedings that fall under 
2151.23(A)(2) (jurisdiction of the juvenile court to determine the custody of any child not a ward of 
another court of this state) whereas this case comes under the purview of 2151.23(A)(1) (concerning 
any child who is alleged to be delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent).  CFS also 
argues that a reversal of the appellate court will “promote the integrity of the legislative process and 
will preserve the unmistakable legislative intent which requires abuse, neglect and dependency 
matters to be decided on the best interests of the child.”  See id. at 8. 
 114. Id. at 8. 
 115. Brief of Appellants Clifford and Stephanie Reust, supra note 68, at 11-31. 
 116. Id. at 12-13.  Aunt and Uncle state in their brief that “[b]y failing to raise the issue at the 
adjudicatory hearing appellee waived his right to require a finding of suitability or unsuitability.”  
Id. at 14. 
 117. Id. at 13-14.  Aunt and Uncle assert that implicit in the finding of neglect is “the suitability 
of the natural parents.”  Id. at 13.  
 118. Id. at 30.  “The Evidence was overwhelming and the Magistrate had the opportunity to 
view the demeanor of all the witnesses and observe their interaction.  It was clear that the 
complained of behavior of appellee was likely to continue.”  The complained of behavior was that 
Father did not care for his older children and had yet shown little interest in C.R.  Id. at 10. 
 119. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 9.  He also argues that distinction 
between 2151.23(A)(1) and 2151.23(A)(2) effects only jurisdiction, and not the substance of claims.  
Id. at 10.  See supra note 113. 
 120. Merit Brief of Appellee Jesse Crowder, supra note 70, at 10-11 (citing Troxel v. 
Granville, 528 U.S. 1151 (2000)).  
 121. Id. at 16. 
17
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Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court decided in favor of CFS and 
Aunt and Uncle, holding that “when a juvenile court adjudicates a child 
to be abused, neglected, or dependent, it has no duty to make a separate 
finding at the dispositional hearing that a noncustodial parent is 
unsuitable before awarding legal custody to a nonparent.”122 
The Ohio Supreme Court proclaimed that there is no statutory 
obligation to find unfitness when there has been an adjudication of 
abuse, dependency, or neglect.123  It reasoned that the decision that a 
child is abused, dependent, or neglected “implicitly involves a 
determination of the unsuitability of the child’s custodial and/or 
noncustodial parents.”124  The Ohio Supreme Court limited their holding 
to proceedings for legal custody.125 
Three justices concurred and three justices dissented in the 
majority’s decision.126  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Pfeifer writes 
that the majority’s holding is “too sweeping and does not allow the trial 
judge discretion to determine that a non-custodial natural parent is 
suitable.”127  The dissent also echoed Father’s brief in asserting that a 
natural parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of 
his natural children which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.128 
The dissent avers that at no point in the proceedings were Father’s 
constitutional rights to the custody of his child appropriately 
considered.129  Finally, Justice Pfeifer expressed concern at the far 
reaching consequences of this decision, “and the negative effect it will 
 
 122. In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 24. 
 123. Id. at ¶ 20-21. 
 124. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 125. Id. at ¶ 17.  “The important distinction is that an award of legal custody of a child does not 
divest parents of their residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.”  The Court also 
states that an adjudication of abuse, dependency, or neglect does not “permanently foreclose the 
right of either parent to regain custody, because it is not a termination of all residual parental rights, 
privileges, and responsibilities, and therefore a motion for a change of custody could be filed in a 
proper case in accordance with law.”  Id. at ¶ 23 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42 (West 
2006)). 
 126. Id. at ¶ 24.  The Honorable Justice O’Donnell wrote the majority opinion.  The Honorable 
Chief Justice Moyer, Justice O’Connor and Justice Lanzinger concurred.  The Honorable Justice 
Resnick, Justice Pfeifer, and Justice Lundberg Stratton dissented.  Justice Pfeifer wrote the 
dissenting opinion.  Id. 
 127. Id.. at ¶ 25. 
 128. Id. at ¶ 26.  The Justice cites Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) and In re 
Murray 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171-72 (Ohio 1990). 
 129. In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at ¶ 29.  (“[W]hen his child was adjudicated neglected, his 
constitutional rights transmogrified into ‘residual rights,’ even though his behavior did not 
contribute to the adjudication of neglect.”).  
18
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have on noncustodial parents seeking custody of their natural 
children.”130 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This section will first analyze the unconstitutional nature of the In 
re C.R. holding by showing that the United States Supreme Court has 
explicitly ruled that an unfitness standard is necessary before the court 
rules against a parent in a custody case.  In addition, a close look at the 
factors used by the United States Supreme Court in deciding whether 
certain procedures meet procedural due process requirements will show 
that the procedures used by the Ohio juvenile courts fall below the 
constitutionally mandated standard. 
The article will then briefly explore the way in which the In re C.R. 
ruling is overreaching.  Though the author sees the ruling as 
unconstitutional as a whole, there are independent reasons why it should 
not be applied to dependency cases in particular. 
There follows a discussion of several of the policies upon which 
juvenile law is bolstered and the ways in which the rule from In re C.R. 
fails to uphold or further those policies.  Finally, the author asserts that 
the C.R. rule does not allow an adequate safeguard for the parents 
against state power.  By showing that a parental unfitness prong is an 
essential part of the custody process and that a finding of abuse, neglect, 
or dependency is not the same as a finding of unfitness, the author 
portrays the defective nature of the procedures currently being used by 
the Ohio juvenile courts. 
A. In re C.R. is Contrary to United States Supreme Court and Ohio 
Supreme Court Precedent 
The United States Supreme Court has established a clear policy that 
a finding of parental unfitness is necessary before the state can sever a 
parent’s custody.131  Justice Stevens expounded on this policy in 1993 
when he explained that no law “authorizes unrelated persons to retain 
custody of a child whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit, 
simply because they may be better able to provide for her.”132 
It was almost one hundred years ago that the United States Supreme 
Court announced that a parent’s right to care, custody, and control of the 
 
 130. Id. at ¶ 30. 
 131. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 132. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993) (Stevens, Circuit Justice) (denying 
adoptive parents’ application for a stay in a case where a child was wrongfully adopted). 
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parent’s children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.133  Thereafter, a parent’s right to the care, 
custody, and control of her child could not be deprived without due 
process of the law. 
Precisely what is required to satisfy due process in regard to 
parental rights has been examined many times in the past one hundred 
years.134  For one, parents need fundamentally fair procedures.135  The 
United States Supreme Court has pointed out that efficiency and 
economy are not adequate reasons to deprive a parent of due process 
protection.136 
More specifically, the United States Supreme Court has established 
that constitutional due process requires a finding of parental unfitness in 
a custody dispute between a parent and nonparent.137  If one applies the 
Eldridge factors to a custody dispute, it is clear that an unfitness finding 
is necessary.138 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action 
is the parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of her 
child.139  In addition, some would argue that the child also has an 
inherent right to be cared for by her biological parent.140  It is already 
well established that the parent’s right to their child is extremely 
valuable and deserving of protection.141  The right of the child to stay 
with her parents is held by such a vulnerable party (the child) that the 
state must take extra caution, restraint and wisdom when exercising its 
power to take that right away from that child.142 
 
 133. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 134. See generally Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656 (1972). 
 135. See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745. 
 136. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 139. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 140. The Children’s Commission for Wales created a list of children’s rights, under which 
Article 9 includes: “You should not be separated from your parents unless it is for your own good.”  
List of Rights, CHILDREN’S COMMISSION FOR WALES, http://www.childcomwales.org.uk/en/know-
your-rights-list (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
 141. The parent’s right to care, custody, and control is an established fundamental right under 
the United States Constitution.  Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 142. Convention on the Rights of a Child, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_protecting.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).  “Human rights apply 
to all age groups; children have the same general human rights as adults. But children are 
particularly vulnerable and so they also have particular rights that recognize their special need for 
protection.”  Id. 
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The second factor requires analysis of whether there is a high risk 
of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used 
and whether there may be probable value in additional procedures.143  
The ruling of In re C.R. fails in this factor. 
The purpose of taking a child away from her parents is to keep the 
child safe when she will not be safe at home.  When the court does not 
require a showing of parental unfitness, it jumps from the finding of 
abuse, dependency, or neglect to the finding that the child will not be 
safe at home without making the necessary inquiry that connects the two 
issues.144  The finding of abuse, dependency, or neglect is a finding (or a 
plea) as to the condition of the child at one point in time that could be 
caused by a multitude of factors that may have little to do with whether 
the child will be safe at home in the future.145  The finding of unfitness is 
a finding about whether the child will be safe at home with the parent for 
the future.146  When the court makes that leap of equating the two 
findings, the risk of erroneously finding that the child will not be safe at 
 
 143. Supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 144. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977); See Generally Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
 145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (West 2006) (“(A) As used in this chapter, ‘neglected 
child’ includes any child: (1) Who is abandoned by the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian; (2) 
Who lacks adequate parental care because of the faults or habits of the child’s parents, guardian, or 
custodian; (3) Whose parents, guardian, or custodian neglects the child or refuses to provide proper 
or necessary subsistence, education, medical or surgical care or treatment, or other care necessary 
for the child’s health, morals, or well being; (4) Whose parents, guardian, or custodian neglects the 
child or refuses to provide the special care made necessary by the child’s mental condition; (5) 
Whose parents, legal guardian, or custodian have placed or attempted to place the child in violation 
of sections 5103.16 and 5103.17 of the Revised Code; (6) Who, because of the omission of the 
child’s parents, guardian, or custodian, suffers physical or mental injury that harms or threatens to 
harm the child’s health or welfare; (7) Who is subjected to out-of-home care child neglect.”); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031 (West 2006) (“As used in this chapter, an ‘abused child’ includes any 
child who: (A) Is the victim of ‘sexual activity’ as defined under Chapter 2907. of the Revised 
Code, where such activity would constitute an offense under that chapter, except that the court need 
not find that any person has been convicted of the offense in order to find that the child is an abused 
child; (B) Is endangered as defined in section 2919.22 of the Revised Code, except that the court 
need not find that any person has been convicted under that section in order to find that the child is 
an abused child; (C) Exhibits evidence of any physical or mental injury or death, inflicted other than 
by accidental means, or an injury or death which is at variance with the history given of it.  Except 
as provided in division (D) of this section, a child exhibiting evidence of corporal punishment or 
other physical disciplinary measure by a parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody, or 
control, or person in loco parentis of a child is not an abused child under this division if the measure 
is not prohibited under section 2919.22 of the Revised Code. (D) Because of the acts of his parents, 
guardian, or custodian, suffers physical or mental injury that harms or threatens to harm the child’s 
health or welfare. (E) Is subjected to out-of-home care child abuse.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  § 
2151.04 (West 2006) (defining dependent child). 
 146. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977). 
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home is substantial.  An additional safeguard to help the court decide 
whether the parent is unfit would substantially improve the chance that 
the court will make the correct finding of whether the child will be safe 
at home with her parents for the future. 
The third Eldridge factor is to ask where the government’s interests 
lie in regard to requiring the additional procedure.147  In this context, the 
government has a high interest in making court proceedings 
economically efficient.148  Requiring one less finding by the court before 
it severs a parent’s legal custody of her child would be more 
economically efficient.  By equating abuse, dependency, and neglect 
with parental unfitness, the court is required to do less fact checking, 
interview fewer witnesses, and spend less time sitting in the courtroom.  
Court appointed guardian ad litems and lawyers have less to investigate 
and argue about, so their fees are lower.149  Altogether, cutting one prong 
out of the previously two-pronged test could save the government 
several hundred dollars on each case.150  Unfortunately, for the state 
coffer, however, efficiency and economy are not adequate reasons to 
deprive a parent of due process protection.151 
As will be discussed in the following pages, the government has no 
interest in conducting custody disputes if a parent is fit to care for their 
child.152  The government, therefore, has a high interest in determining 
whether the parent is fit because if he is, then the custody dispute and 
drain on state resources can end.153  The third Eldridge factor for 
sufficient due process is satisfied only if there is a requirement for 
finding parental fitness. 
Application of the Eldridge factors make it clear that a finding of 
parental fitness or unfitness is required in order to afford a parent her 
constitutional right to due process.  Until the ruling in In re C.R., in 
cases where the United States Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court 
 
 147. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 148. Lori Lee Fehr, Dependency:  The Unknown Battlefield, FLORIDA BAR NEWS, Sept. 15, 
2003, available at http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-3397696/Dependency-the-unknown-
battlefield.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).  “Dependency hearings fill the dockets of judges.  In one 
afternoon session as many as 50 judicial review hearings are held.  It is not unheard of for hearings 
to go on past 8 p.m.”  Id. 
 149. Id.  “These attorneys are the lowest paid state employed attorneys; they have large 
caseloads, some as high as 250 cases; they work long hours; have an extremely limited budget for 
support services; are publicly scrutinized and criticized, and yet are driven by the children whose 
lives they advocate for relentlessly.”  Id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 152. See infra pp. 919-23 
 153. See id. 
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asked that question, those Courts explicitly came to the same 
conclusion.154 
In addition to disregarding federal constitutional due process 
requirements, the C.R. Court did not follow its own precedent.155  The 
Ohio Supreme Court does not purport in its opinion to overrule 
precedent.156  The Ohio Supreme Court had little power to overrule the 
United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Stanley v. Illinois or Troxel v. 
Granville, which both emphasized how necessary it is to find parental 
unfitness before a court could assign the care, custody, or control of a 
child to a nonparent.157  The Ohio Supreme Court got around that barrier 
by equating the finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency with parental 
unfitness, an equation that is hugely flawed.158 
The Ohio Supreme Court established a clear two-prong test in In re 
Peralas.159  If a court was going to award custody of a child to a 
nonparent the court must find: 1) that it is in the best interest of the child 
and 2) that the parent is an unfit parent.160  Perales was consistent with 
United States Supreme Court rulings and it reinforced the policies of the 
Ohio juvenile justice system, which will be discussed in the following 
pages.161 
In that case, a mother had signed a contract purporting to give 
custody of her child to the babysitter.162  As in many cases of this type, 
the mother in Perales may have been in an abusive relationship.163  She 
testified that she feared that if she brought the child home, her husband 
might hurt the baby.164  The mother took the child to a sitter and left the 
 
 154. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977); see also Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. 
 155. See In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 1-24. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).   
 158. See In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at ¶ 1-24. 
 159. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id.  
 162. See id. at 1047. 
 163. See id. and infra note 164. 
 164. In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d at 1048.  With the realization in recent years that children who 
witness domestic violence are, themselves, victims to domestic violence, came the “unanticipated 
effect” that children were often removed from their mother’s custody after their mother had 
successfully extricated herself from the abusive relationship.  Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of 
Time:  Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination 
Proceedings,  11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176, 218 (2004).  This cycle has been dubbed “double 
abuse.”  Id. 
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baby there for roughly two years.165  During that time, the mother signed 
an agreement purporting to give custody of the child to the babysitter.166 
One must ask how an Ohio Supreme Court would rule in the case 
of In re Perales if it were presented to a bench today.  After mother’s 
husband moved out, she presented a motion requesting the Court to order 
the babysitter to return the child.167  First, would the court have found the 
child to be abused, dependent, or neglected at any time before such 
motion?  Under Ohio Revised Code section 2151.03(A), a neglected 
child is any child “(1) Who is abandoned by the child’s parents, 
guardian, or custodian.”168  From the limited facts given in the case, it 
appears that the child in In re Perales would qualify as a neglected 
child.169 
If the battle over custody between the babysitter and the mother of 
baby Perales came to an Ohio court today and there had already been a 
finding that the baby had been neglected by her mother, then no finding 
that the mother is unfit would be necessary before the court could award 
custody to the babysitter.170  The only finding that the court would need 
to make is whether it is in the best interests of the child to stay with the 
babysitter, who raised her all her life, or go back to her mother, with 
whom she had not lived for two years.171  It would be no surprise for the 
court to find that it is in the best interest of baby Perales to be placed in 
the legal custody of her babysitter, but that would be the opposite 
conclusion that the court came to in that case, which is still good law in 
Ohio.172 
The Ohio Supreme Court ruled in In re Perales that custody could 
not be awarded to the nonparent without first making a finding of 
parental unsuitability or unfitness.173  Perales was rightly decided 
because it is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent.174  
The ruling in In re C.R. creates a new standard that, if applied to In re 
Perales, could come out with a completely different outcome.175  Perales 
 
 165. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d at 1048. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (A)(1) (West 2006). 
 169. See id. 
 170. See In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 1-24.   
 171. See id. 
 172. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).   
 175. See In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at ¶ 1-24.   
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was rightly decided and the C.R. Court was wrong to decide 
contrarily.176 
The Ohio Supreme Court in In re C.R. distinguished itself from In 
re Perales by explaining that it is not eliminating the prong of parental 
suitability, just replacing it with the finding of abuse, neglect, or 
dependency, if there has been one.177  The problem with this, as will be 
explained in this article, is that the abuse, neglect, and dependency are 
not the same as parental unfitness.178  It is an inadequate replacement.  
Having an inadequate replacement is unacceptable because, as pointed 
out by the application of the Eldridge factors, the finding of parental 
unfitness is a necessary part of the parent’s due process.179 
The post-C.R. procedure for awarding custody of a child to a 
nonparent violates the federal constitution and is contrary to Ohio 
Supreme Court precedent.  As Ohio case law confirms, the strictures of 
procedural due process require that a finding of parental unfitness be 
made before a court can award custody of a child to a nonparent.180  
B. The Ruling in In re C.R. is Overreaching 
Dependency is the least extreme of the three classifications used by 
Ohio juvenile courts to categorize children who are in need of the state’s 
services.181  Under the Ohio Revised Code, the definitions of abuse and 
neglect include both explicit and implicit references to the child being in 
that condition by the fault of the parent.182  The definition of a delinquent 
child, on the other hand, explicitly excludes situations where the parent 
is at fault.183 
The In re C.R. Court ruled that the court does not need to make a 
separate finding of parental unfitness before awarding custody of a child 
to a nonparent when there has previously been a finding that the child 
was abused, neglected, or dependent,.184  C.R. was adjudicated a 
neglected child.185  The rule of the case is overreaching because it states 
 
 176. See infra, pp. 919-29. 
 177. See infra, pp. 919-29. 
 178. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 180. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977). 
 181. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  
 182. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 183. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(A) (West 2006). 
 184. See In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 1-24. 
 185. See id. 
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that findings of dependency will also allow the court to forego making a 
finding that the child is unfit before awarding custody to a nonparent.    
This differentiation is very important, especially in the context of a 
subsequent custody battle.  The Ohio Supreme Court in In re C.R. 
replaced the parental unfitness prong of the test with the finding of 
abuse, neglect, or dependency.186  This prong was originally meant to 
focus on the parent’s ability to parent.187  In that context, there may be a 
big difference between whether the child was abused or neglected by the 
fault of their parent or if she was dependent through no fault of the 
parent. 
The inquiry into parental unfitness should never have been equated 
by the In re C.R. court to a finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency.188  
By stretching their ruling in a case that involved neglect to cover cases 
that involve dependency, the Ohio Supreme Court not only made a faulty 
ruling, it also stretched that faulty ruling into cases where it should never 
apply. 
C. Parens Patriae  
According to the age old theory of parens patriae, the government 
is empowered to use its authority to protect those who cannot protect 
themselves.189  The theory depends on a viewpoint of society that is 
patriarchal.190  In that viewpoint, the government is the father of all the 
people it governs.191  Just as fathers must make decisions to ensure the 
wellbeing of their children, the United States government is empowered 
to decide what should be done to protect those who are not otherwise 
cared for. 
The government’s fathering functions are especially important to 
children.192  Most societies work upon the assumption that people below 
 
 186. See id. 
 187. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977). 
 188. See supra note 186. 
 189. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).  Parens Patriae extends back to the time 
of kings and means literally that the king is the father of the country.  “parens patriae (par-enz pay-
tree-ee or pa-tree-I).  [Latin in “parent of his or her country”] 1.  The state regarded as a sovereign; 
the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves <the attorney 
general acted as parens patriae in the administrative hearing>; in Roman law, the emperor.”  Id. 
 190. In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at ¶ 30. 
 191. Id. 
 192. SUSAN REACH WINTERS & THOMAS D. BALDWIN, 11 N.J. PRAC. FAMILY LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 26.6 (2010).  The right of parens patriae protects children and prohibits their abuse and 
neglect.  Id. 
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a certain age need the care and influence of an adult.193  This is certainly 
true for very young children and it is generally accepted that the need for 
adult supervision extends to young people until they are nearly out of 
their teenage years. 
In Ohio, a person is a juvenile until he or she is eighteen.194  If a 
child under eighteen is not being adequately cared for by her parents, 
then the state is authorized to step into the role of a parent and make 
decisions for the welfare of that child.195  The power of the government 
to step into the parents’ shoes is known as “in loco parentis,” which 
literally means “place of a parent.”196 
The state has an interest in making decisions for children in lieu of 
the children’s parents when the parents are not able or willing to take 
adequate care of their children.  The state’s interest has several facets.  
One facet is that the state has a high interest in children attending school 
and being able to positively contribute to society.197  The state is also 
interested in children having a role model to teach them that it is wrong 
to break the law, so that they will grow up to be law-abiding citizens.198  
Another theory is that a child owes allegiance to her country from the 
moment that she is born and so she is entitled to the protection of that 
government.199  Lastly, and most importantly, people are compelled to 
 
 193. See generally Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to 
Protect Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 311 (2006) (arguing that parents should have an 
affirmative duty in tort to protect their children from harm). 
 194. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.353(E)(1) (West 2006). 
 195. Id.  The juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a child until he is eighteen unless the child 
is developmentally disabled, mentally retarded or physically impaired, in which case the juvenile 
court retains jurisdiction until the age of twenty-one.  Id. 
 196. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004) (“in loco parentis (in loh-koh 
p<<schwa>>-ren-tis), adv. & adj [Latin ‘in the place of a parent’] Of, relating to, or acting as a 
temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a 
parent.”).  For example, when a child is at school, her teacher is regarded to as acting in loco 
parentis.  Id. 
 197. Ibtisam S. Barakat & Janet A. Clark, Positive Discipline and Child Guidance, 
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI EXTENSION (revised Apr. 2007), available at 
http://extension.missouri.edu/publications/DisplayPub.aspx?P=GH6119 (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).  
Giving a child positive influence and teaching him discipline are crucial to allowing him to become 
able to make thoughtful choices.  Id. 
 198. Ariel Ledesma, On Teaching Children the Rules and the Law, HOUSTON TEACHERS 
INSTITUTE (2004), available at http://hti.math.uh.edu/curriculum/units/2004/08/04.08.05.php (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2011).  In learning about the law, children begin to understand what will happen if 
they transgress the law.  Id. 
 199. The Government’s Duty to Protect the Lives of its Citizens under the Due Process Clause, 
EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/ 
projects/ftrials/conlaw/stateactionprotect.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).  The question of whether 
the government owes a duty of affirmative protection without a special relationship was answered in 
the negative in the case of DeShaney vs Winnebago Department of Social Service.  See Deshaney v. 
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ensure the wellbeing of those who cannot care for themselves because it 
is human nature and the mark of a civil society that the strong should 
care for the weak. 
The government acts for the wellbeing of children through all three 
of its branches.200  In Ohio, the legislature has devoted nearly an entire 
section of the Ohio Revised Code to juvenile matters.201  There are 
juvenile courts throughout the state that handle juvenile delinquency and 
dependency, abuse, and neglect cases.202  In a dependency, abuse, and 
neglect case, the juvenile court decides whether to classify a child under 
one of those three categories.  If a classification is appropriate, the court 
then decides what should happen to ensure the welfare of the child.203  
Members of the executive branch, such as the police, do what needs to 
be done on the outside to make sure the court’s order is followed. 
The most extreme act that the government is empowered to do to 
protect children is to take children out of the custody of their parents 
against the parents’ wills.204  The legislature has recognized its 
responsibility to protect children by drafting legislation that requires a 
finding of the best interest of the child before a court is authorized to 
transfer legal custody away from a parent.205  The Ohio Supreme Court 
later interpreted the legislation to require a two-prong test of best interest 
as well as parental unfitness before custody may be transferred.206 
The decision to require this specific two-pronged finding is in line 
with the rationale that the government is allowed to intercede on behalf 
of a child in the first place.  In order to satisfy all of the interests that the 
state has in the proper care of its children, each child must have a willing 
and capable caretaker.207  In the most common and best case situations, a 
child’s parents will fill that role.  If the child’s parent is willing and able 
to fill that role, then the state does not have a reason or justification for 
                                                                                                                                 
Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).  The question is still up for debate, 
though, as evidenced by Justice Blackmun’s dissent in that case where he states that he would have 
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required this affirmative duty.  See 
id. at 212-13. 
 200. See infra pp. 27-28. 
 201. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151 (West 2006). 
 202. See id. § 2151.23. 
 203. Id. 
 204. In re Hayes, 679 N.E.2d 680, 682-83 (Ohio 1997) (citing In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 54 
(Ohio Ct. App. 6th 1991)).  “Permanent termination of parental rights has been described as “the 
family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.”  Id. 
 205. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42(A) (West 2006). 
 206. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977). 
 207. Ibtisam S. Barakat & Janet A. Clark, Positive Discipline and Child Guidance, University 
of Missouri Extension (revised April 2007),  available at http://extension.missouri.edu/publications/ 
DisplayPub.aspx?P=GH6119 (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
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stepping into the parent’s role.  The state needs to be in loco parentis 
only when the parent is not willing or able to be an adequate parent. 
The state has an adverse interest in filling the role of parents who 
are fit to fill the role themselves.  The separation of a child from her 
parents is very traumatic for all parties involved.208  The system that the 
child enters once out of the parent’s care and into the government’s is 
praiseworthy but imperfect.209  In addition, the cost upon the state to 
provide for the care of children who could be adequately cared for by 
their parents is an unnecessary drain to the state’s economy.210 
For these reasons, the state has a very high interest in requiring the 
unfitness prong of the two-pronged test.  Furthermore, if a parent is 
found to be fit, then the state no longer has any interest in acting in loco 
parentis. 
The state serves an important function when it intercedes in a 
family to make decisions for the care of a child when that child will 
otherwise not receive necessary care.211  The important function is only 
served, however, when it is truly necessary for the state to intercede.  If a 
child will be properly cared for by her parents, then the state’s 
interference will result in many negative consequences to child, parents 
and state.  The unfitness factor of a custody decision is the protective 
tool that keeps that from happening. Without the unfitness factor, the 
state’s important function would cease to be efficient or effective. 
 
 208. Karen DeBord, Ph.D., When Parents Must Go Away: Staying Connected to the Children, 
NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, available at 
http://www.ncpen.org/Separation.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).  “Children who are separated from 
their parents can exhibit anxiety, withdrawal, anger, aggression, and other disorders that affect 
socialization and ultimate school performance.”  Id. 
 209. Lisa Kim Bach, Child Welfare:  Inaction on Problems with Child Welfare System 
Unacceptable, Assemblywoman Warns, REVIEWJOURNAL.COM (Feb. 04, 2007), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2007/Feb-04-Sun-2007/news/12038818.html (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2011).  The article in the Las Vegas Review Journal reports that in Clark County Nevada in 
2006 four or more children who had been taken into protective custody had died, one foster child 
had gone missing and two cases were filed alleging child endangerment.  Id. 
 210. Study Notes Child Welfare Problems, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD-EAGLE.COM, (Sept. 30, 
2009), available at http://record-eagle.com/statenews/x546321745/Study-notes-child-welfare-
problems (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
 211. Committee on Professional Practice and Standards, Guidelines for Psychological 
Evaluations in Child Protection Matters, 54 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 586 (1999), available at 
http://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/child-protection.pdf.   “According to the U.S. Advisory 
Board on Child Abuse and Neglect (ABCAN), conservative estimates indicate that almost two 
thousand infants and young children, or 5 children every day, die from abuse and neglect by parents 
or caretakers each year.”  Id. at 586. 
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D. Safeguard Against State Power 
1.  Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency do not Equal an Unfit Parent 
Without the unfitness prong of the two-prong custody test, parents 
do not have an adequate safeguard against the power of the state in a 
battle to keep their children.  Without the unfitness standard, all that is 
left for the court to find before it may sever legal custody is a question of 
best interests.212  The best interest of the child is an extremely important 
but very imprecise factor.  The finding of best interest is based on a 
multitude of subjective criteria.213  Such an inexact measure of judgment 
should not be the sole basis upon which a court makes such a crucial 
decision as severing the legal relationship between parent and child.214 
The Ohio Supreme Court in In re C.R. did not presume that the best 
interest factor alone was enough to transfer legal custody.215  Instead, the 
Ohio Supreme Court held that a finding of abuse, dependency, or neglect 
could supplant the unfitness factor so that if there had been such a 
finding in the dispositional phase of the case then a finding of the best 
interests of the child alone was sufficient in the adjudication phase of a 
custody case.216  The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that an abuse, 
dependency, or neglect finding was similar enough to an unfitness 
finding that the former could replace the latter.217 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning in this respect was flawed.  
Dependency, neglect, and abuse each have separate, distinct definitions 
in the Ohio Revised Code.218  None of those definitions are the same as 
an unfit parent.219  The classifications of dependency, abuse, and neglect 
 
 212. See In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1977). 
 213. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(D) (West 2006).  The court must consider all relevant 
factors, including, but not limited to (a) interaction and interrelations parents, siblings, relatives etc 
important people, (b) wishes of the child as reported by guardian ad litem, (c) custodial history of 
the child, (d) child's need for permanent placement and whether that can be achieved without the 
grant of permanent custody, (e) whether factors in §2151.414(E) (7) to (11) apply (pertains to 
whether the parents have been convicted or pleaded guilty to certain offenses).  Id. § 2151.414 (D), 
(E)(7)-(11). 
 214. Retired Judge William Bailey emphasizes the subjectivity of the best interests test by 
teaching the juvenile law classes at the University of Akron School of Law about “swimming pool 
cases,” in which one party argues that it is in the best interest of the child to live with them because 
they have more resources and more to offer the child, a.k.a. they have a swimming pool and the 
other party does not.  (Judge Bailey presided over the Wayne County juvenile court in Ohio.) 
 215. In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 23. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at ¶ 22-24. 
 218. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 219. Id.  Unfit parent has been harder to define.  Ohio’s Seventh District Court of Appeals 
defined an unfit parent as “one who is unsuitable to raise a child,” which is circuitous at best.  In re 
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focus on the child alone.220  The finding of any of them depends on the 
condition of the child regardless of the fitness of a parent.221  A parent is 
not convicted of any crime or given any punishment as a result of his or 
her child being adjudicated abused, dependent, or neglected.222  Only the 
unfitness standard focuses on the parent. 
The disposition phase of litigation, where custody is decided, is 
different than the adjudication phase, where the classification of abuse, 
neglect or dependency is decided.223  The importance of having a 
standard that focuses on the parent during disposition is that this phase is 
meant to be forward-looking.224  Commentators David G. Duff and 
Roxanne Mykitiuk state in their article, Parental Separation and the 
Child Custody Decision:  Toward a Reconception: 
while the focus of traditional adjudication is uniformly retrospective, 
evaluating past acts and events against judicially elaborated norms to 
govern the specific relationship giving rise to the dispute, custody 
decisions based on the best interests of the child are implicitly forward-
looking, based on the court's assessment as to the optimal placement to 
promote the future welfare of the child. 225 
At the disposition, the court asks whether the parent has been able 
to remedy the parenting issues and, if so, whether the parent will be able 
to maintain a good environment for the child in the future.226  This 
temporally-minded decision making is one important way in which 
disposition is different than adjudication and why an unfitness standard 
is necessary. 
At the time of the adjudication, the court focuses on the facts 
leading up to the hearing and how the child should be classified based on 
those facts.227  If the child is adjudged to have been abused, dependent, 
or neglected, then the court will order that the parties act to improve the 
                                                                                                                                 
Kaiser, 2004 Ohio 7208, 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th 2004) (As an example of unfit parents, the court 
describes ones who grew marijuana and took their child along when doing drug deals.) 
 220. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 222. General Information about Child Abuse and Neglect, LEGAL AID NETWORK OF 
KENTUCKY (reviewed Aug. 2009), available at http://www.kylawhelp.org/node/596 (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2011).  This site gives general information about abuse, neglect and dependency cases and 
explains that a parent is not convicted of anything or receive criminal penalties as the direct result of 
an abuse, neglect or dependency adjudication.  Id. 
 223. See supra note 44. 
 224. David G. Duff & Roxanne Mykitiuk, Parental Separation and the Child Custody 
Decision: Toward a Reconception, 47 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 874, 894 (1989). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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situation.228  If the child has been taken from her parent by 
recommendation of the child services agency, the agency must create a 
plan of reunification.229 
The plan of reunification is commonly called a case plan.230  The 
case plan is a list of objectives that the children’s services agency 
recommends the parent complete in order to correct the situation that led 
to the child being adjudicated abused, dependent, or neglected.231  If the 
child has been separated from his parents, the parents are told by the 
agency that that they need to complete their case plan in order to get 
their child back.232 
At the time of disposition, the court inquires into whether the parent 
has substantially completed the objectives of his or her case plan.233  
This inquiry reflects the forward looking character of the disposition.  
The case plan objectives are those things that the parent can do to correct 
the situation that caused the child to be abused, dependent, or 
neglected.234  If the parent has completed the case plan, he will likely 
believe that the child’s future with the parent is secure.235  He would be 
wrong.236  According to In re C.R., if the child was adjudicated abused, 
neglected, or dependent, then the court may keep the child out of the 
custody of her parent, whether or not the parent completed his case plan, 
if that is in the best interests of the child. 
Some may argue that if a parent, through his action or inaction, 
allows his child to become dependent, neglected, or abused, then that 
parent is unfit.  It is not adequate to assume that if a child has been 
abused, dependent, or neglected then that means that the child’s parent is 
unfit.  In the case of In re C.R., C.R. was neglected before her father 
even knew that he was her father.237  The court made no finding that it 
 
 228. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.28(B) (West 2006) (“At an adjudicatory hearing held 
pursuant to division (A)(2) of this section, the court, in addition to determining whether the child is 
an abused, neglected, or dependent child, shall determine whether the child should remain or be 
placed in shelter care until the dispositional hearing.”). 
 229. See id. § 2151.412(A). 
 230. See id. § 2151.412 (entitled “case plans”). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. § 2151.28(F)(1) (“All case plans for children in temporary custody shall have the 
following general goals . . . . To eliminate with all due speed the need for the out-of-home 
placement so that the child can safely return home.”). 
 233. Id. § 2151.415(H)(2) (entitled Motion for order of disposition upon termination of 
temporary custody order). 
 234. See id. § 2151.412(F). 
 235. Supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 236. See In re C.R., 108 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, at ¶ 1-24. 
 237. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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was Father’s fault either that the child was neglected or that he did not 
know that the child was his.238  This is an especially unfair assumption 
when it comes to dependent children. 
The standards for abuse, dependency, and neglect are not the same 
as parental unfitness.239  In the case of dependency, especially, there is 
no finding of parental unfitness.240  The Ohio Revised Code definition of 
a dependent child is any child: 
(A) Who is homeless or destitute or without adequate parental care, 
through no fault of the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian; 
(B) Who lacks adequate parental care by reason of the mental or 
physical condition of the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian; 
(C) Whose condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in 
the interests of the child, in assuming the child’s guardianship; 
(D) To whom both of the following apply: 
(1) The child is residing in a household in which a parent, guardian, 
custodian, or other member of the household committed an act that was 
the basis for an adjudication that a sibling of the child or any other 
child who resides in the household is an abused, neglected, or 
dependent child. 
(2) Because of the circumstances surrounding the abuse, neglect, or 
dependency of the sibling or other child and the other conditions in the 
household of the child, the child is in danger of being abused or 
neglected by that parent, guardian, custodian, or member of the 
household.241 
Part (A) of the statute points out specifically that the term 
“dependency” does not apply if there has been a finding that the parent is 
at fault.242  It is injudicious and inexplicable for a court to equate a 
finding of dependency with a finding of parental unfitness. 
By the terms of the statute, a child could be dependent for many 
reasons that are no fault of the parents’.243  Under (A), a child could be 
adjudged dependent if his parents are very poor, a condition that the 
legislation of this country has yet to find personal fault in.244  Under (B) 
 
 238. See In re C.R., 843 N.E.2d at ¶ 1-24. 
 239. Supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 240. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 (West 2006) (defining dependent child). 
 241. Id. (emphasis added).    
 242. Id. § 2151.04(A). 
 243. See id. § 2151.04. 
 244. Id. § 2151.04(A).  New York Times Op-ed contributor Barbara Ehrenreich was convinced 
otherwise by a new study done by the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty which 
showed that ordinances against things typically done by the very poor such as sleeping on the 
sidewalk or under a bridge have increased since 2006.  Barbara Ehrenreich, Op-Ed, Is It Now a 
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a child could become dependent if her parent was in an accident that left 
the parent in the hospital under medical care for months.245  If that 
parent, through care and rehabilitation, is able to leave the hospital and 
return to adequate physical form, would it be fair for a court to rule that 
the parent is effectively unfit for the future just because her child was 
dependent on the state for a period of time? 
By equating unfitness with abuse, dependency, or neglect, the 
courts ignore the future and focus only on the past.  It no longer matters 
if the parent completes their case plan.  The label “plan of 
reconciliation” becomes a mockery if at the point of adjudication, before 
the plan commences, the disposition of custody is a foregone conclusion.  
The only way for the court to properly focus on whether the child can 
reconcile with their parent and have a better future is to require a 
separate inquiry into parental fitness. 
2.  Parents Often Plead to Abuse, Dependency, or Neglect 
Another reason why there are not adequate safeguards against state 
power unless a finding of parental unfitness is required in these cases is 
that parents who are facing adjudication will often enter a plea deal, 
permanently giving up their rights to try the issue of whether the child 
really is abused, neglected, or dependent.246  When they get to the stage 
of disposition, they may lose custody of their child without the court 
ever finding that the child was unsafe in her parents’ care, just as in the 
case In re C.R. 
It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which a parent involved 
in such an adjudication would be tempted to enter into a plea bargain.247   
One possible situation is where the children’s services agency has reason 
to believe that the parent is using drugs in the home.  A concerned 
neighbor could have reported that he saw through a window that the 
mother (Mother) was smoking marijuana.248  The neighbor tells the 
                                                                                                                                 
Crime to Be Poor?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/opinion/09ehrenreich.html?pagewanted=all. 
 245. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(B) (West 2006). 
 246. Allan R. De Jong, Impact of Child Sexual Abuse Medical Examinations On the 
Dependency and Criminal Systems, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 645 (1998) (analyzing the 
percentage of cases which were decided by plea before the hearing). 
 247. The following is a hypothetical created by the author for the purpose of examining a 
realistic, though fictional, situation in which a parent would plead to abuse, neglect or dependency 
without realizing the far-reaching consequences of that action. 
 248. In 1988, the Fifth Appellate District of Ohio held that a child to be abused, dependent and 
neglected after a police raid revealed a large amount of marijuana in the family’s home.  In re 
Campbell, No. CA-383, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 3508 (Ohio Ct. App.Aug. 11, 1988). 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/8
13-SEMPLE_44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  4:03 PM 
2011] HOLDING ON TO WHAT IS MOST PRECIOUS 929 
agency that they should become involved because there is a child in the 
home. 
The agency does become involved when it has reason to believe 
that Mother is using marijuana and left the marijuana out where her 
fifteen year old son found it and also smoked some.249  The agency files 
a complaint alleging that the fifteen year old is neglected under Ohio 
Revised Code section 2151.03 (2) because the fifteen year old “lacks 
adequate parental care because of the faults or habits of the child’s 
parents.”250 
When the mother attends her pretrial for the pending case, she finds 
out that the prosecutor is offering a plea where she will find the child 
dependent, rather than neglected, if the mother will only plead to the 
charges.251  If Mother does not plead, she will have to proceed to a trial 
on whether the child was actually neglected.  Mother does not want to go 
to trial for several reasons: 1) she does not want to pay for an attorney 
and is not poor enough to have appointed counsel, 2) if the prosecution 
proves that the marijuana was hers, she could be criminally liable, and 3) 
she doesn’t realize at the time that the plea of dependency means giving 
up the right to a finding of parental fitness should there be a disposition 
of custody.  Therefore she pleads.  No one ever knows for sure whether 
the state would have been able to prove their case. 
Would it be fair in a situation like this one to presume that the 
mother is unfit just because she entered a plea, admitting that her child 
was dependant?  Is it fitting that the custody of that child could be 
awarded to another solely on the basis of a finding that it is in the best 
interests of the child to live somewhere else? 
The answer to both questions is no.  The right to the care and 
custody of one’s children is a constitutionally protected, fundamental 
right.252  The safeguards that control the state’s power to sever custody 
must be formidable.253  Without the requirement of a parental unfitness 
finding, the safeguards are far from formidable; they are feeble. 
 
 249. “When Congress adopted [Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997], it noted that, along 
with poverty, substance abuse is ‘one of the three most common reasons for children entering foster 
care.’”  Ross, supra note 164, at 210 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 19 (1997)). 
 250. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(A)(2) (West 2006). 
 251. The differences between “dependent” and “neglected” are explained in supra note 145. 
 252. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 253. In Santosky v. Kramer the United States Supreme Court found that it was important 
enough that parents have an adequate safeguard to protect their rights to care, custody, and control 
of their child that they saw fit to announce that those rights shall be protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). 
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V.  CLOSING 
The state of Ohio has the power to deprive its people of life, liberty, 
and property, but not without the due process of law.254  Severing the 
legal and physical relationship between a child and her mother or father 
requires no less.  This rational conclusion is in harmony with the 
common understanding that there is a deep and valuable bond between 
parents and their children. 
There are good reasons why the Ohio courts, up until the decision 
in In re C.R., required a parental unfitness standard before severing a 
parent’s legal custody.  It has been this author’s goal to show those 
reasons in order to express that a prior adjudication of abuse, neglect, or 
dependency is not an adequate or appropriate replacement for a finding 
of unfitness.  In order to truly ensure the best interests of the child, the 
family, and the community, the courts or the legislature should re-adopt 
the prior standard of requiring a showing of parental unfitness before 
awarding legal custody to a nonparent.  Anything less is both unwise and 
unconstitutional. 
 
 
 254. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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